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ABSTRACT
Several recent proposals have advocated using the income tax system to collect user fees to
help fund the health care system. While there is a considerable amount of research investigating both
how individuals respond to tax incentives for employer provided health insurance and on the effects
of user fees payable at the point of service on the use of health care services, there is limited
evidence on how individuals respond to tax incentives when these are not realized until taxes are
paid. 
This paper uses existing exemptions in the Canadian tax code that allow individuals to
deduct the cost of health care or health insurance from their taxable income in order to identify the
tax price elasticity of demand for health care when price changes are realized at the end of the tax
year. Our results suggest that despite not realizing the tax benefit at the time of purchase, individuals
are quite responsive to changes in the tax price of health care. Our elasticity estimates for a wide
range of health care products are well within the range of traditional price elasticity estimates,
including in particular our estimates for prescription drugs. We also find some evidence that
suggests individuals trade off risk sharing through traditional insurance companies with risk sharing
through the tax code. That is, as the tax price of health care decreases, individuals spend more on
health care, but spend less on health insurance.
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  The tax system is one of the primary tools by which governments 
provide assistance to people with high health expenditures. In the United 
States, Canada, and elsewhere, governments exempt employer-provided 
health care benefits from taxable income, thereby subsidizing the purchase of 
health insurance through the workplace. The U.S. government has developed 
other mechanisms by which individuals can shelter the cost of medical 
expenses from taxes including Section 125 plans and Archer MSA accounts.  
Recently, debate surrounding the growing number of uninsured in the U.S. 
has focused on refundable tax credits as a mechanism for extending 
insurance coverage to the uninsured (Goodman, 1999).  
  In Canada several proposals have recently emerged which would use 
the tax system as a mechanism for collecting benefit taxes for the use of 
health care services. Such proposals either suggest the inclusion of health 
care services as taxable income (Kent, 2000), the use of the tax system to 
collect fees on a percentage of health care spending scaled by taxable income 
(Aba, Goodman, and Mintz, 2002) or a tax credit against which health care 
expenses would be deducted (Reuber and Poschmann, 2002). Proponents of 
these plans argue that the existing tax structure would facilitate the 
administration of benefit taxes for health care, and would also allow the 
government to easily identify and exempt those populations that are likely to   2
be unable to pay the benefit taxes.  In every case, the response to such plans, 
whether they be to insure the uninsured, or to collect benefit taxes, hinges on 
how responsive individuals are to tax incentives.  
  A considerable volume of previous research has investigated how 
individuals respond to tax incentives for health insurance purchased through 
an employer (see Gruber, 2001 for a review of the literature). There is also a 
growing consensus among economists about how user fees payable at the 
point of service affect the use of health care services (Glied and Remler, 
2002).  However, there is far less evidence on how individuals respond to tax 
incentives when these benefits are not realized until taxes are paid. Despite 
the fact that many countries allow individuals to deduct some portion of their 
direct medical expenses from taxable income, the elasticity of demand for 
medical care and medical insurance in such contexts remains at best poorly 
understood.   
  This paper uses the existing tax treatment of medical expenditures in 
Canada in order to identify the tax price elasticity of demand for health care 
when price changes are realized at the end of the tax year. We exploit 
variation in the tax price of health care both within Canadian provinces over 
time and across individuals within provinces to identify how individuals 
respond to tax incentives reducing the price of both health care and health 
insurance.    3
  Our results suggest that individuals are quite responsive to changes in 
the tax price of health care, even though the tax benefits are not realized at 
the time of purchase. Our elasticity estimates for a wide range of health care 
products are well within the range of traditional price elasticity estimates, as 
are our elasticity estimates for spending specifically on prescription drugs.  
  One notable feature of the Canadian system is that the tax credit 
applies equally to taxpayers’ out-of-pocket medical expenses and to premiums 
for private health insurance plans.  As such, the system leaves the relative 
price of market insurance and self-insurance unchanged, and individuals’ 
demand for insurance could either rise or fall, depending on second-order risk 
tolerance considerations.  Consistent with this view, we find some evidence of 
a negative effect of the tax subsidy on private insurance premiums.  That is, 
as the tax price of health care decreases, individuals spend more on health 
care, but spend less on health insurance. 
  The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the 
previous literature on tax subsidies and cost sharing in health insurance. 
Section 3 explains the workings of the medical expense tax credit in Canada. 
Section 4 describes the data used in the analyses. Section 5 outlines our 
empirical strategy. Section 6 presents our results and section 7 offers some 
conclusions.  
 
2. Previous Literature   4
 
  Through extensive empirical research, economists have developed a 
good understanding of how cost sharing affects health care utilization. Most 
of the literature focuses on two areas. The first estimates the price elasticity 
of demand for health care.  The most comprehensive study estimating the 
price elasticity of demand for health care remains the RAND health 
insurance experiment (Newhouse, 1993) which finds significant differences in 
the use of health care services depending on the out-of -pocket price at the 
time of use. Elasticity estimates in the RAND experiment are on the order of 
–0.2.  A second branch of the literature has examined the price elasticity of 
demand for health insurance. Here, most researchers examine the demand 
for employer-provided health insurance using variation in the tax-price of 
insurance to identify the demand for insurance.  For example, Gruber and 
Poterba (1996) use variation created by the 1986 US Tax Reforms to examine 
changes in the demand for insurance among the self-employed. Stabile (2001) 
and Finkelstein (2001) use variation across and within provinces in Canada 
to identify the price elasticity of demand for supplemental employer-provided 
health insurance. In all cases, estimates of the price elasticties are generally 
significant, but inelastic, ranging from –0.2 to –0.7.1 
                                                 
1   Previous work has also examined the effects of deductibles on the demand for medical care 
services (Keeler et al., 1977, Newhouse et al., 1980). The theoretical work shows that consumers who 
expect to exceed the deductible in a given payment year will behave as though they do not face a 
deductible, whereas those who do not expect to exceed the deductible will behave similarly to a an 
uninsured individual. (Keeler et al., 1977).  
   5
  These estimates have, directly or indirectly, informed a more recent 
policy literature examining the potential role for Medical Savings Accounts in 
the health care system. Such accounts would involve employers or 
governments providing a fixed amount of money to individuals each year for 
health care services. Individuals would then be free to allocate these funds as 
they see fit. Once the account maximum is reached, individuals are either 
covered by catastrophic health insurance or face some “spending corridor” for 
which all costs are paid out of pocket before catastrophic insurance kicks in. 
In the event that the full account balance is not used in a given year it can 
either be rolled over for future use or used for other purposes depending on 
the specifics of the proposal. Variations on these proposals suggest using the 
income tax system to administer tax credits to apply towards health care 
(Reuber and Poschmann, 2002) or health insurance spending (Goodman, 
1999). While there have been attempts to simulate the effects of this type of 
cost sharing (Keeler et al, 1996; Eicher, McClellan, and Wise, 1996) these 
studies generally rely on demand elasticities from the RAND experiment or 
other sources in the literature and do not directly estimate whether 
individual behaviour under MSA plans is similar to individual behaviour 
under traditional cost-sharing arrangements. 
  A number of policy analysts have advocated using credits or fees 
administered through the income tax system to help manage health care 
utilization (see Stabile, 2003 for a general review of such proposals).   6
However, we are unaware of any previous literature that directly examines 
the effects of cost sharing for health care services when the costs are not 
borne at the time of use, but rather at the end of the fiscal year. Evidence 
from other markets suggests that people may indeed respond differently 
when they do not faces out-of-pocket costs at the time of use, but instead pay 
later. For example, Gross and Souleles (2002) find that individuals change 
their spending behaviour and the debt that they carry on their credit cards 
with changes in their spending limits.  It is therefore quite feasible that 
estimates of the price elasticity of demand for both health care and health 
insurance may be quite different depending on when out-of-pocket costs must 
be paid for.  There is also a related literature investigating the effects of 
tuition credits for post secondary education in the United States. Long (2003) 
investigates the effects of the Hope and Lifetime Learning Tax Credits which 
provides aid for college expenses. Like the tax credits investigated here, there 
is a significant delay between college enrollment and when the tax credit is 
received. Two results from this literature may be useful for better 
understanding the behaviour investigated here: first, despite the fact that the 
tax credit is at the end of year, people still appear to adjust their behaviour 
regarding educational choices. Long finds that students were more likely to 
attend more expensive colleges as a result of the tax credit. Second, the take-
up of this credit is much lower that might be expected—only one third of   7
individuals who are eligible for the school credit actually take it up. Both of 
these findings will be consistent with the analysis we present here. 
 
 
3. The Canadian Medical Expense Credit 
 
  The current system of tax relief for medical expenditures in Canada is 
based on a non-refundable federal income tax credit for qualifying medical 
expenditures.  Qualifying medical expenditures can be paid by or on behalf of 
the taxpayer, his or her spouse, and dependant family members, and a claim 
must be accompanied by receipts.  A broad list of expenditures is prescribed 
in the legislation, including: 
 
i.  payments to hospitals, doctors, dentists, and other health professionals 
for medical services; 
ii.  expenditures on a variety of medical devices, such as wheelchairs, 
prosthetic limbs, iron lungs, and so on, as well as hearing aids, 
dentures, and prescription eyeglasses; 
iii.  the costs of full-time care in a nursing home or in the patient’s own 
home, including the costs of home renovations for disabled patients; 
iv.  expenditures on prescription drugs; and 
v.  premiums paid for private health insurance plans.   8
 
As this list suggests, the credit was conceived of by federal authorities as tax 
relief for taxpayers facing catastrophic health costs and disabilities, but the 
credit is far more broadly available.  In Canada, most health care costs 
incurred in a hospital or a doctor’s office are covered by publicly-funded 
health insurance. Coverage for these services is first dollar and universal. 
Despite this coverage, more than 30 percent of health care spending in 
Canada is privately financed (OECD, 2001). Any portion of these privately 
financed services not reimbursed by an insurance company is eligible for the 
tax credit. No services reimbursed by a health insurance plan are eligible. A 
significant fraction of taxpayers claims the credit each year (just over 10 
percent of tax filers in 2000), and tax advisers and health-care providers 
frequently advise clients on how to take advantage of it.2 
  For the 2000 tax year, the system worked as follows: an individual 
could claim a credit for 17 per cent for medical expenses in excess of either 
$1,637 or three per cent of the individual’s net income, whichever is less; 
however, the credit cannot reduce the tax liability below zero.  (Since the 17 
per cent rate was then the federal tax rate in the lowest income bracket, the 
non-refundable credit therefore operated exactly like a deduction from 
taxable income for expenditures over the threshold amount, except that the 
treatment is more favourable for taxpayers in low brackets than high 
                                                 
2 For example, an advertisement for one cosmetic surgery practice explains the intricacies of the credit to 
prospective patients through an example and concludes, “your facelift would qualify for a 22 per cent 
rebate”.   9
brackets.)  Since the 1997 tax year, some claimants have also been eligible for 
a supplementary credit, equal to 25 per cent of the basic credit amount, up to 
a maximum (in 2000) of $507.  Unlike the basic credit, the supplementary 
credit is refundable for taxpayers without taxable income, and the 
supplement is reduced by five cents for each dollar by which the claimant’s 
adjusted net income exceeds $17,664. 
  The effect of both the basic and supplementary credits is to reduce the 
after-tax price of health care expenditures, but the precise magnitude of the 
marginal subsidy is complicated.  Figure 1 depicts the notional budget 
constraints under the various regimes facing a household which chooses a 
bundle consisting of health care services H and a composite, taxable 
consumption good C.  The dotted line, closest to the origin, represents the 
budget constraint that would apply if health care expenditures were fully 
taxable, and the household’s taxable income were Y.  The budget constraint 
for the basic credit regime, which applied prior to 1997, is represented by the 
line BEY: health expenditures in excess of the threshold H0 (which depends 
on income) are eligible for the federal credit rate.  The budget constraint for 
the supplementary credit regime introduced in 1997 is represented by the 
line ADEY: expenditures between H0 and H1 are eligible for both credit and 
supplement, while higher amounts are eligible for the credit alone. 
  Thus the “tax price” of health care expenditures facing each taxpayer 
depends on the level of expenditures chosen.  Importantly for our work,   10
however, the tax price varies for reasons unconnected with the household’s 
choices.  As noted previously, the first threshold level is the lesser of 3 per 
cent of net income and a dollar amount that has varied annually.  The second 
threshold level is in turn a decreasing function of income, with the maximum 
supplement fully taxed back for taxpayers with net income over $27,804.   
  As well, the tax price in both ranges differs among households.  In all 
provinces but Quebec, provincial income tax liabilities have been calculated 
as a surtax on basic federal tax minus federal non-refundable credits 
(including the medical expense credit).  Consequently, the effective credit rate 
in these provinces was increased from 17 per cent to 17(1+ tp) per cent, where 
tp is the provincial surtax rate, which ranged between 0.44 and 0.62  in 2000, 
and which have varied in each province over time.  In Quebec, provincial tax 
liabilities are calculated as a function of income rather than federal tax, so 
that the federal credit does not have a cascading effect on provincial 
liabilities.  However, Quebec operates its own credit and refundable 
supplement for medical expenditures which has roughly paralleled the 
federal system, but which is somewhat more valuable than the implicit 
credits offered by the other provinces.3  Furthermore, prior to 1987, tax relief 
for medical expenses was implemented as a deduction rather than a credit.  
Consequently, for 1986 (the first year in our sample), the effective subsidy 
                                                 
3 The basic credit in Quebec applies to expenditures in excess of 3 per cent of net income, with no 
maximum amount for the threshold, unlike the federal credit.  The refundable supplement is available only 
to taxpayers with employment income, and is taxed back in roughly the same way as the federal 
supplement.  Of course, Quebec taxpayers are eligible for the federal credit and supplement on their federal 
tax liabilities, in addition to the provincial tax relief.   11
rate was equal to the taxpayer’s actual marginal tax rate on income, rather 




  We use data from the Family Expenditure Survey (FAMEX) and its 
successor, the Survey of Household Spending (SHS), from 1986 through 2000. 
The FAMEX is a cross sectional Canadian data collected approximately every 
other year.  Respondents are asked detailed questions on family income and 
expenditure, including a module on health care spending. The income and 
expenditure data are collected for the entire preceding year (so, for example, 
the 2000 survey is conducted in 2001). Income and demographic data for both 
the reference person and the spouse of the reference person includes income 
before taxes, earned income, self-employment income, transfer income, 
investment income, sex, age, marital status, and number of children. 
(Questions on educational attainment of respondents were discontinued in 
1997.)  Health care expenditures include direct health care expenditures for 
the household (such as medical and dental services, prescription and over the 
counter drugs), spending on health insurance premiums not reimbursed by 
government or employer-provided health plans, and so on. All expenditure 
amounts are collected for the family as a whole, which is also the unit for   12
which expenditures are eligible for credit under the Medical Expense Tax 
Credit.   
  We calculate detailed tax information for all the observations in our 
sample. Tax information is based on the income and demographic 
information available in the FAMEX and SHS surveys and is calculated 
using a Canadian tax rate calculator developed by Kevin Milligan at the 
University of British Columbia. Tax information includes the individual’s 
marginal tax rate, average tax rate, and total tax burden. In addition to this 
information we construct a module to provide us with the marginal tax price 
of health care under the medical expense tax credit (which is different from 
the individual’s marginal tax rate on earned income), the dollar thresholds at 
which each household begins and ceases receiving the credit and supplement, 
and the tax price of the first dollar of creditable expenditure.  
  We report means and standard deviations for the main variables in the 
sample (calculated for all survey years) in Table 1. Mean health care 
expenditure is $1025 in 1991 Canadian dollars. The mean expenditure on 
health insurance premiums is $322. Total expenditures for the entire family 
averaged $43,149. Average individual income is $26,959, and the average tax 
price in the sample, including all individuals who do not qualify for the credit 
and hence have a tax price of 1, is 0.907. The average tax price for the sub-
sample of individuals who qualify for the credit is 0.714.  Forty  percent of 
families in our data have sufficient health care spending to qualify for at   13
least $1 of credit, however it is very unlikely that anyone who only qualified 
for a $1 credit would go through the effort of claiming the medical expense 
tax credit on his or her return. Imposing a cutoff of, say, $50 in tax reduction 
as a requirement for applying for the credit, and restricting the sample to 
those who actually owe taxes, 16 percent of families in our data would receive 
the credit. This number is almost identical to the numbers given in the 
government’s aggregate taxation statistics, which report that approximately 
15 percent of filers with taxable incomes apply for the credit (Canada 
Customs and Revenue Agency, 2002).  
Who takes up the medical expense credit?  The Canadian Customs and 
Revenue Agency provides information on take-up of the credit by individual 
income group for the 2000 tax year. We report these rates as a fraction of 
either total returns or taxable returns in the first two columns of table 2. 
Unfortunately we have no way of knowing what percent of individuals 
actually take-up the credit as a fraction of those eligible for the credit. Take-
up rates decline with income, primarily due to the income scaled threshold.  
The threshold reaches its maximum at approximately $53,000 in taxable 
income and, as shown in Table 2, the take-up rate also appears to level off at 
about 5 percent at and above $60,000.  
We report take-up in the FAMEX in two ways: first we include all 
families whose health care spending exceeds the minimum threshold for a 
credit, and second we impose a minimum claim of $50 (and hence a tax price   14
less than 1) in order to be counted as taking-up the credit. This second 
method is comparable to the second column of Table 2, but will 
underestimate take-up for low-income families in our sample.  Take-up rates 
also decline in the FAMEX data, although the declines are less pronounced.  
While it is difficult to fully understand who takes up the credit and why, the 
most likely causes of the discrepancy between suggested take-up in the 
FAMEX and the actual take up rates are that individuals are either not 
aware that the credit exists, or do not take the steps required to file for the 
credit. Both of these causes would bias against us finding a significant tax-
price elasticity of demand for medical care. 
  Finally, as noted above, any individual within the family can claim 
health care expenditures for the entire family. In order to maximize the 
benefit, the lowest income individual for whom the whole credit can apply 
should claim the credit. In our analysis, however, we assume that the 
primary survey respondent is the individual who claims the credit. This 
assumption would again bias against us finding a significant tax-price 
elasticity of demand for medical care.  
 
5. Empirical Strategy 
  
Our analysis exploits variation in the individual tax price generated in 
four ways, as outlined above. First, there are changes within provinces over   15
time generated by changes in provincial income tax rates. Second, there is a 
large change in 1987 from tax deductions to tax credits, which significantly 
increased the tax price of medical care by different amounts depending on the 
individual’s federal tax bracket. Third, Quebec’s separate tax collection 
program offers provincial credits for medical credits which are higher than 
those in other provinces and which also changed over time. Fourth, 
supplemental tax credits for medical care expenses were added to the tax 
code in 1997, the amount of which differs by income, province, and year. 
While we exploit all these sources of variation, we have also re-estimated our 
models excluding each source of variation separately to ensure that our 
analysis is not being driven by one source of variation in particular.  
  We pool the eight years of data and estimate models of the form: 
 
it t Year i ov it X it price tax it H ε π γ δ β α + + + + + = Pr ) ( ) log(  (1) 
 
where the dependent variable,  the log of health spending, takes on four 
values: total health care spending, direct health costs to households (all 
spending minus spending on health insurance premiums), spending on health 
insurance premiums, and spending on prescription drugs in particular. We 
use log spending to help normalize the distribution of health care spending, 
but our results are not sensitive to using levels instead of logs. Since almost 
no households have zero spending in any of the four categories (the exception   16
being health insurance premiums) we lose very few observations from moving 
from levels to logs. While all four of these spending categories are broadly 
eligible for tax credits, and hence should respond to changes in the tax price,4 
we are particularly interested in the last two—health insurance premiums 
and prescription drug spending—since these are more directly comparable to 
estimates from previous studies. Tax price is our calculated tax price of 
medical spending. X includes a quartic polynomial in income and a quadratic 
in age, as well as sex, marital status, number of children, and total 
expenditure by the household. Prov are province fixed effects and Year are 
year fixed effects which are included in all specifications. 
  The tax price calculated for each household is a function Pit(Hit) that is 
endogenous to the health care spending decision Hit.  A household spending 
more than the eligibility threshold faces a lower tax price than an otherwise 
identical household spending less than the threshold; similarly, a household 
with spending in excess of the amount eligible for the supplement faces a 
lower tax price than one in the supplement range. We use two strategies for 
dealing with the endogeneity of the tax price. First, primarily for comparative 
purposes, we examine only those households whose spending exceeds the 
household’s threshold level to qualify for the medical tax credit. Examining 
this selective sample provides some information as to the source of variation 
in spending behaviour. Specifically, it allows us to check whether we are 
                                                 
4  There are some minor expenses reported in Famex/SHS that are not eligible for the tax credit (Hawley, 
2001). The health insurance premiums and prescription drug categories, however, do not include any such 
expenses.    17
identifying our estimates purely based on the difference between individuals 
who do and do not receive a tax credit, or whether there is further 
identification to be gained by those individuals who exceed the credit 
threshold.  
Our second method for dealing with endogeneity is to construct two 
instruments for the tax price of medical care. The first is the change in the 
tax price from the previous year, Pit(Hit) – Pit-1(Hit). This amounts to holding 
constant all the individual characteristics, including medical spending, and 
taking the difference in the tax price generated only through changes in the 
tax laws between years t-1 and t.  Of course, this remains a function of 
observed health spending Hit, but it is apt to be uncorrelated with spending 
in the absence of a behavioural response, because of the extreme non-
linearity of the tax price function and the tendency for tax reforms over our 
sample period to affect tax prices at different parts of the health spending 
distribution.  What is particularly attractive about this instrument is that it 
not only picks up the variation within province over time, it also varies across 
households within a province based on a fixed set of individual 
characteristics.  
The second instrument is the household’s first dollar tax price of 
medical care, calculated as the tax price of medical care an individual would 
receive for the first dollar of spending above his or her individual threshold. 
In this case, the instrument is completely independent of the household’s   18
actual health care spending behaviour, but varies within provinces over time. 
It also varies with family income within a province for the 1986 year, since 
the measure was then a tax deduction rather than a credit, and from 1997 
onwards when some low-income families were eligible for a supplemental 
credit. However, for the majority of our sample, this instrument is 
independent of both health care spending and income, and fixed within a 
province/year cell.  We present estimates using each of these instruments 
separately, and then using them together. Overidentification tests suggest 
that the inclusion of the additional instrument is valid. First stage results for 
the instruments are reported in notes to the tables. Given that the 
instruments are constructed to be highly correlated with the actual tax 




We begin by presenting results from estimates of equation (1) by OLS. 
These estimates use the full sample. The coefficients on tax price suffer from 
endogeneity bias, but are a useful starting point for comparative purposes.  
The first column of Table 3 reports the results using all health care spending 
as the dependent variable. Our results suggest a large and significant 
negative relationship between the tax price of medical care and health care 
spending.  The quartic in income does a reasonable job of fitting the   19
relationship between income and health spending, with higher income 
households spending more on health care. Married couples and families with 
more children have higher health care expenditures.5 The estimate on the tax 
price of medical care, which translates into an elasticity of approximately –
2.9 is clearly too large to be plausible, primarily because these estimates 
reflect the fact that individuals with higher health spending will also have a 
lower tax price of medical care. 
  Columns two through five of Table 3 report similar results for direct 
health care expenditures, health insurance expenditures, and prescription 
drug expenditures. Income remains positively correlated with health 
spending for both direct health care costs and health insurance spending. 
However, there is a negative correlation between income and prescription 
drug spending. This result may reflect the fact that income is strongly 
correlated with having supplemental drug insurance in Canada. If high 
income individuals are more likely to have their prescriptions paid for by an 
insurance company, then lower income individuals will appear to spend more 
out of pocket on prescription drugs. The tax-price coefficients on health 
insurance premiums and prescription drug expenditures are considerably 
smaller, as would be expected given that they are a subset of total health care 
costs. However, the elasticity estimates, -1.4 for health insurance spending 
and -1.26 for prescription drug expenditure, are still larger than most 
                                                 
5 We re-run all specifications while excluding families with children. Our results in that case are very 
similar to those reported here.    20
estimates in the literature. This is surely due to the endogeneity of the tax 
price. To account for this we turn now to estimates which either restrict the 
sample to those who have spending above the individual threshold for the 
medical expense tax credit, or which instrument for the tax price.  
  As noted above, once spending on health care exceeds the credit 
eligibility threshold determined by income, and year, the tax price of medical 
care is only weakly and positively related to health care spending.  (Once the 
maximum threshold for the supplement has been exceeded, the tax price is 
independent of spending.)  Therefore, it is possible to examine whether 
individuals who are already heavy health care spenders respond to changes 
in the tax price of medical care. The results are presented in Table 4. 
Estimates for all four measures of health spending remain negative and 
highly significant. Of particular interest are the estimates of the effects of tax 
price on health insurance spending and on prescription drug spending, 
presented in columns 3 and 4. Here the coefficient estimates are considerably 
smaller than those obtained using the full sample. Using the mean tax price 
for the conditional sample (0.71), the estimated elasticity for health insurance 
spending is -0.25 and for prescription drug spending the elasticity estimate is 
–0.24. These results are much more in keeping with estimates of the price 
elasticity of medical care when the price is paid at the point of service (see 
Newhouse, 1993, Gruber and Poterba, 1994, Stabile, 2001).  While we are 
ultimately interested in elasticities for the entire sample and not just the   21
sub-sample of high health care spenders, these results do suggest that part of 
our identification is coming from spenders above the  threshold levels. 
  We next turn to presenting estimates using the two instruments for 
the tax price of medical care: the difference in tax prices between t-1 and t, 
and the first dollar marginal tax rate. The first instrument relies on changes 
in the tax price over time, holding health care spending and income constant. 
The second instrument is independent of health care spending and, for most 
households in the sample, independent of income as well. Table 5 presents IV 
results using the difference in tax price as an instrument. Controlling for the 
endogeneity of the tax price produces estimates of the elasticity of demand for 
medical care at tax time that are in keeping with point of service estimates in 
the literature. The elasticity of demand for prescription drug spending is –
0.46, similar to the range of estimates for prescription drug spending in both 
Canada and the US (Zweifel and Manning, 2000).  Using the first dollar 
marginal tax price (Table 6) yields a slightly smaller, but still significant 
elasticity estimate of –0.27, and using both instruments to over-identify the 
coefficients yields a similar estimate of –0.29. As noted above we can not 
reject the over-identification test of the additional instruments. Other 
coefficients are similar in magnitude to their OLS counterparts.   22
That these estimates are so similar to the previous literature is 
somewhat surprising.6  There are a number of reasons to believe that 
individuals would be more sensitive to changes in the price of health 
spending when they pay for those services at the time of use, rather than 
some months later, at tax time. Our estimates strongly reject this, however, 
with consistent evidence of a negative and significant price elasticity in the 
range of -.027 to -0.46 under our instrumental variables specifications.  
  The estimates for private health insurance premiums are particularly 
striking. Using the change in tax price between t and t-1 as an instrument 
produces a positive and significant elasticity estimate for health insurance 
spending (Table 5, column 3): an increase in the tax subsidy causes demand 
for health insurance to fall.  (All elasticity estimates for other spending 
categories remain negative and significant.)  The result is surprising but is in 
fact not inconsistent with optimizing behavior by taxpayers.  Since both 
health insurance premiums and out-of-pocket expenditures are eligible for 
the credit, the tax law leaves the relative price of market health insurance 
and self-insurance unchanged.  Consequently, the choice between the two is 
affected by tax rules only to the extent that changes in after-tax income 
change taxpayers’ capacity for risk tolerance.  A decrease in an individual’s 
tax rate in a proportional tax system (and hence an increase in the tax price 
of health care) should cause the demand for health insurance to rise when the 
                                                 
6 As specification checks we re-run all of the analysis omitting Quebec and omitting the 1986 data (before 
the deduction turned into a credit) to ensure that neither of these single sources of variation are driving our 
results. The results remain quite similar in both cases.    23
individual displays increasing relative risk aversion, and demand should be 
unaffected in the central case of constant relative risk aversion.  Indeed, our 
particular result is in keeping with recent findings by Cutler (2002), who 
finds evidence that recent increases in the total premium costs of health 
insurance in the US have lead to increases in health insurance take-up. 
Using our alternate the first dollar marginal tax rate instrument for the tax 
price, however, reverses the sign of the estimate (Table 6). Combining the two 
instruments, the coefficient estimate (and hence the elasticity) is once again 
positive, but not quite significant at the 10 percent level (Table 7).  Therefore, 
while there is some evidence that individuals may trade off insurance 
spending for risk sharing in the tax system, the evidence is not completely 
robust to the choice of instrument.  
 
7. Discussion and Conclusions 
 
  We use the existing tax treatment of medical expenditures in Canada 
in order to identify the tax price elasticity of demand for health care when 
price changes are realized at the end of the tax year.  Our findings suggest 
that individuals respond to the tax credits in much the same fashion as they 
do to variation in prices at the point of service. In fact, in our preferred 
instrumental variables specifications we find price elasticities in the range of 
–0.27 to –0.9 across different categories of medical care spending, well within   24
the range of price elasticites reported in the literature. For prescription drug 
spending in particular, our findings are quite similar to those found in the 
RAND health insurance experiment (Newhouse, 1993), which found little 
difference in price responsiveness between prescription drugs and other 
forms of medical care.  
  Since both health insurance premiums and out-of-pocket expenditures 
are eligible for the credit, the tax law leaves the relative price of market 
health insurance and self-insurance unchanged.  We find some evidence that 
increases in the tax price lead to increases in spending on health insurance, 
consistent with individuals displaying increasing relative risk aversion. 
Our findings support the view advanced by some policy-makers that 
the income tax system can be an effective method of influencing the use of 
health care services. In the Canadian context, our results suggest that benefit 
taxes collected at tax time would have effects similar to user charges at the 
point of service. However, in the former case, low-income individuals who 
know they will not be subject to benefit taxes would not be deterred from 
using services. In the U.S. context, our results suggest that tax credits for 
items such as prescription drugs are likely to be effective and  promoting 
prescription drug spending in providing some relief from high drug costs.  
  One qualification to our results is that we estimate that more high-
income households should be claiming the medical care expense credit  than 
actually do. We estimate that 21 percent of households with incomes over   25
$50,000 qualify for the credit, yet Canada Customs and Revenue Agency 
suggests that only 6 percent of tax filers with taxable returns in this income 
group actually do claim the credit. Low take up is by no means unique to this 
program. The Medicaid program has long experienced low take-up rates 
despite numerous efforts to inform eligible families of about the program 
(Aizer, 2003).  We suspect that the reason for low take up rates in the 
Canadian case is that it can be cumbersome to collect and retain the receipts 
necessary to make a claim. Further, some families might not anticipate that 
annual expenditures will be high enough to qualify for the credit until part 
way through the year, so that they would not begin to collect receipts until it 
is effectively too late.  Of course, the failure of some eligible households to 
claim the credit should work against finding tax responsiveness in the data.  
Nevertheless, we find robust evidence of significant price elasticities in our 
estimates.  
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Table 1: Means 
 
 
Variable  Mean   Standard Deviation 
Total Health exp  1025.001  1133.16 
Direct health care costs  702.22  926.06 
Health Insurance 
Premiums 
322.78    531.10    
Prescription Drugs  184.25  401.77    
Tax Price  0.907    0.142        
Change in Tax Price  -0.002    0.039       
First dollar MTR  0.179    0.148           
Income  26959.78     21949.68      
Age  48.21     16.307          
Male  0.5353   0.498          
Married  0.618    0.485          
Number of Kids  0.613    0.955          
Total Expenditure  43149.47     29318.54   
Threshold for credit 
eligibility 
592.610     583.947      
    




Source: FAMEX and SHS 1986-2000.  29
Table 2: 
Take-Up of the Medical Expense Tax Credit in 2000 
Group   Take-Up as a 
Percent of All 
Tax Filers 

















10% 15% 41%  16% 
15-20 K  20%  24%  51%  21% 
20-25 K  18%  19%  47%  25% 
25-30 K  15%  15%  44%  26% 
30-40 K  12%  12%  38%  24% 
40-50 K  8%  8%  31%  21% 
50-60 K  6%  7%  28%  20% 
60-70 K  5%  5%  24%  17% 
70-80 K  5%  5%  27%  20% 
80-90 K  5%  5%  25%  19% 
Columns 1 and 2 taken from the CCRA (2003). Columns3 and 4 are authors’ 
calculations using the 2000 SHS. 
Column 4 is calculated by imposing a minimum claim of $50 on individuals in 
order to be counted as taking up the medical expense credit.   30
Table 3: OLS Full Sample 










Tax Price  -3.20**  -2.71**  -1.56**  -1.42** 
 (0.025)  (0.027)  (0.028)  (0.035) 
Income 1.0E-6**  3.52E-6**  2.30E-6**  -0.00001** 
 (7.2E-7)  (7.93E-7)  (8.40E-7)  (1.05E-6) 
Income^2 -1.47E-10** -3.74E-11**  -3.89E-12  1.35E-10** 
 (1.46E-11)  (1.59E-11)  (1.62E-11) (2.14E-11) 
Income^3 3.81E-16**  -4.95E-17  -1.33E-16  -4.47E-16** 
 (9.21E-17)  (1.01E-16)  (9.91E-17) (1.37E-16) 
Income^4 -2.87E-22*  2.11E-22 3.15E-22*  4.04E-22 
 (1.66E-22)  (1.81E-22)  (1.73E-22) (2.41E-22) 
Age 0.0099**  0.0087**  0.023**  0.021** 
 (0.0014)  (0.0015)  (0.0018)  (0.0020) 
Age^2 0.00010**  0.00012**  -0.00016**  0.00001 
 (0.00001)  (0.00001)  (0.00002)  (0.00002) 
Male -0.150**  -0.148**  -0.00094  0.059** 
 (0.0077)  (0.0085)  (0.0094)  (0.011) 
Married 0.483**  0.429**  0.308**  0.265** 
 (0.0084)  (0.0092)  (0.010)  (0.012) 
Number of 
Kids 
0.022** 0.050**  0.028**  -0.030** 
 (0.0040)  (0.0044)  (0.0049)  (0.0058) 
Total 
Expenditure 
0.00001** 0.00001**  0.00001**  0.00000** 
 (0.00000)  (0.00000)  (0.00000)  (0.00000) 
Constant 7.19**  6.45**  5.85**  4.93** 
 (0.046)  (0.050)  (0.056)  (0.066) 
R-squared 0.367  0.268  0.239  0.138 
Source: FAMEX and SHS 1986-2000. Standard errors in parentheses. All 
specifications include year and province dummies. The dependent variables 
are in logs.  ** denotes significance at the 5% level and * denotes significance 
at the 10% level.     31
Table 4: OLS for families with expenses above the eligibility threshold 










Tax Price  -1.55**  -1.20**  -0.356**  -0.331** 
 (0.032)  (0.036)  (0.038)  (0.048) 
Income 0.00003**  0.00002**  0.00002**  1.50E-6 
 (0.00000)  (0.00000)  (0.00000)  (1.30E-6) 
Income^2  -3.77e-10**     -2.63e-10**     -1.32e-10**     -4.35e-11*    
  (1.72e-11)     (1.97e-11)    ( 1.82e-11)      (2.60e-11)     
Income^3  1.32e-15**     8.70e-16**  3.33e-16**     2.92e-16*    
  (1.06e-16)      (1.22e-16)       (1.10e-16)       (1.62e-16)     
Income^4  -1.51e-21**     -9.94e-22**     -2.54e-22     -5.79e-22**    
  (1.86e-22)      (2.12e-22)      (1.89e-22)      (2.87e-22)     
Age 0.016**  0.018**  0.022**  0.033** 
 (0.0016)  (0.0018)  (0.0020)  (0.0024) 
Age^2 -0.00004**  -0.097**  -0.00061  0.089** 
 (0.00002)  (0.010)  (0.011)  (0.014) 
Male -0.120**  -0.00004**  -0.00022**  -0.00016** 
 (0.0089)  (0.00002)  (0.00002)  (0.00002) 
Married 0.523**  0.412**  0.331**  0.254** 
 (0.0097)  (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.015) 
Number of 
Kids 
-0.025** 0.00067  0.017** -0.077** 
 (0.0048)  (0.0055)  (0.0056)  (0.0073) 
Total 
Expenditure 
0.00001** 0.00001**  0.00001**  0.00000** 
 (0.00000)  (0.00000)  (0.00000)  (0.00000) 
Constant 5.49**  4.86**  4.81**  3.75** 
 (0.053)  (0.061)  (0.063)  (0.080) 
R-squared 0.395  0.254  0.266  0.095 
 
Source: FAMEX and SHS 1986-2000. Standard errors in parentheses. All 
specifications include year and province dummies. The dependent variables 
are in logs.  ** denotes significance at the 5% level and * denotes significance 
at the 10% level.   32
Table 5: IV Full Sample Using Change in Tax Price Between t and t-1 as an 
Instrument 











Tax Price  -0.662**  -0.701**  0.421**  -0.515** 
 (0.117)  (0.124)  (0.147)  (0.150) 
Income 0.00002**  0.00001**  0.00001**  -0.00001** 
 (0.00000)  (0.00000)  (0.00000)  (0.00000) 
Income^2  -3.89e-10**    -2.29e-10**     -1.94e-10**     4.27e-11*   
  (1.89e-11)     (2.01e-11)     (2.19e-11)      (2.61e-11)     
Income^3  1.73e-15**     1.02e-15**     9.10e-16**     6.99e-17    
  (1.15e-16)     (1.22e-16)       (1.29e-16)       (1.61e-16) 
Income^4  -2.41e-21**    -1.47e-21**     -1.30e-21**     -4.13e-22    
  (2.00e-22)     (2.12e-22)      (2.16e-22)      (2.82e-22)    
Age 0.019**  0.016**  0.032**  0.025** 
 (0.0016)  (0.0017)  (0.0020)  (0.0021) 
Age^2 -0.00002  0.00003**  -0.00028**  -0.00004* 
 (0.00002)  (0.00002)  (0.00002)  (0.00002) 
Male -0.167**  -0.161**  -0.013  0.057** 
 (0.0082)  (0.0088)  (0.0099)  (0.011) 
Married 0.492**  0.435**  0.303** 0.259** 
 (0.0089)  (0.0095)  (0.011)  (0.013) 
Number of 
Kids 
0.024** 0.052**  0.034**  -0.031** 
 (0.0043)  (0.0045)  (0.0051)  (0.0058) 
Total 
Expenditure 
0.00001** 0.00001**  0.00001**  0.00000** 
 (0.00000)  (0.00000)  (0.00000)  (0.00000) 
Constant 4.60**  4.41**  3.90**  4.03** 
 (0.126)  (0.134)  (0.153)  (0.160) 
R-squared 0.291  0.222  0.161  0.129 
 
Source: FAMEX and SHS 1986-2000. Standard errors in parentheses. All 
specifications include year and province dummies. The dependent variables 
are in logs.  ** denotes significance at the 5% level and * denotes significance 
at the 10% level. The first stage t-statistic for the excluded instrument is 
67.9. See text for construction of the instrument.    33
Table 6: IV Full Sample using First Dollar Tax Price as an Instrument 










Tax Price  -1.09**  -0.804**  -0.105*  -0.303** 
 (0.055)  (0.059)  (0.057)  (0.068) 
Income 0.00002** 0.00001**  0.00001**  -0.00001** 
 (0.00000)  (0.00000)  (0.00000)  (0.00000) 
Income^2  -3.48e-10**     -2.19e-10**    -1.43e-10**     2.11e-11    
  (1.59e-11)     (1.71e-11)     (1.73e-11)      (2.23e-11)      
Income^3  1.50e-15**       9.62e-16**    6.34e-16**     1.91e-16    
  (9.93e-17)      (1.07e-16)       (1.05e-16)       (1.42e-16)      
Income^4  -2.05e-21**     -1.38e-21**    -8.71e-22**     -6.04e-22**   
  (1.77e-22)     (1.91e-22)      (1.82e-22)      (2.55e-22)     
Age 0.018**  0.016**  0.030**  0.026** 
 (0.0015)  (0.0016)  (0.0018)  (0.0021) 
Age^2 0.00000  0.00004**  -0.00025**  -0.00005** 
 (0.00001)  (0.00002)  (0.00002)  (0.00002) 
Male -0.164**  -0.160**  -0.010  0.057** 
 (0.0081)  (0.0087)  (0.0097)  (0.011) 
Married 0.491**  0.435**  0.305**  0.258** 
 (0.0088)  (0.0095)  (0.011)  (0.013) 
Number of 
Kids 
0.024** 0.052**  0.033**  -0.031** 
 (0.0042)  (0.0045)  (0.0050)  (0.0058) 
Total 
Expenditure 
0.00001** 0.00001**  0.00001**  0.00000** 
 (0.00000)  (0.00000)  (0.00000)  (0.00000) 
Constant 5.04**  4.51** 4.42**  3.81** 
 (0.069)  (0.074)  (0.075)  (0.088) 
R-squared 0.315  0.226  0.197  0.124 
 
Source: FAMEX and SHS 1986-2000. Standard errors in parentheses. All 
specifications include year and province dummies.  The dependent variables 
are in logs.  ** denotes significance at the 5% level and * denotes significance 
at the 10% level. The first stage t-statistic for the excluded instrument is 
157.4. See text for construction of the instrument. 
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Table 7: IV Full Sample using both Change in Tax Price and First Dollar Tax 
Price as Instruments 
 










Tax Price  -1.03**  -0.790**  -0.061  -0.327** 
 (0.053)  (0.057)  (0.056)  (0.066) 
Income 0.00002**  0.00001**  0.00001**  -0.00001** 
 (0.00000)  (0.00000)  (0.00000)  (0.00000) 
Income^2  -3.54e-10**     -2.20e-10**     -1.48e-10**     2.34e-11    
  (1.58e-11)     (1.70e-11)     (1.73e-11)      (2.23e-11)     
Income^3  1.53e-15**     9.70e-16**     6.57e-16**     1.78e-16    
  (9.91e-17)      (1.07e-16)       (1.05e-16)       (1.41e-16)     
Income^4  -2.10e-21**     -1.39e-21**     -9.06e-22**     -5.83e-22**    
  (1.77e-22)     (1.91e-22)      (1.82e-22)      (2.55e-22)    
Age 0.018**  0.016**  0.030**  0.026** 
 (0.0015)  (0.0016)  (0.0018)  (0.0021) 
Age^2 -0.00000 0.00004**  -0.00025**  -0.00005** 
 (0.00001)  (0.00002)  (0.00002)  (0.00002) 
Male -0.164**  -0.160**  -0.010 0.057** 
 (0.0081)  (0.0087)  (0.0097)  (0.011) 
Married 0.491**  0.435**  0.304**  0.258** 
 (0.0088)  (0.0095)  (0.011)  (0.013) 
Number of 
Kids 
0.024** 0.052**  0.033**  -0.031** 
 (0.0042)  (0.0045)  (0.0050)  (0.0058) 
Total 
Expenditure 
0.00001** 0.00001**  0.00001**  0.00000** 
 (0.00000)  (0.00000)  (0.00000)  (0.00000) 
Constant 4.98**  4.50**  4.37**  3.84** 
 (0.067)  (0.072)  (0.074)  (0.087) 
R-squared 0.312  0.226  0.194  0.124 
 
Source: FAMEX and SHS 1986-2000. Standard errors in parentheses. All 
specifications include year and province dummies. The dependent variables 
are in logs.  ** denotes significance at the 5% level and * denotes significance 
at the 10% level. The first stage F-statistics for the excluded instruments is 
13,788. See text for construction of the instrument. 
 



















The figure depicts a notional budget constraint for 2 goods: C, a taxable 
consumption good, and H, health care spending. 
 
 
 
 
 
 